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determined needs. . . . This is at once relativistic, positivistic, pragmatic, and constructive" (p. 18). As regards the 'simple' ideas, with which we seemed to start, these are gradually found to be complex, derived, and conditioned. Otherwise expressed, "they become increasingly regarded as working assumptions and less and less as established facts" (p. 22). As regards 'complex' ideas, not only are substances (so far as knowable) and relations (taken in any definite sense) 'constructs,' but the same really applies to 'modes' as well (p. 74). And yet none of these are more arbitrary than the purposes which determine their spheres of relevance, and these may be as significant as you please for the interpretation of experience.

The author's own position, which is more or less involved throughout, seems to be a sort of compromise between idealism and pragmatism. It might perhaps be described as instrumental idealism, recognizing the reality of change and actual novelty in the world process, with strong but not unambiguous emphasis upon individuality in terms of the self. It is equally opposed to sensationalism, any form of realism which insists upon the externality of relations, and absolute idealism. In the opinion of the reviewer, Dr. Hartmann not infrequently reads too much into Locke—not merely too much of more modern philosophy, but too much of his individual point of view—but he is right in attempting to differentiate Locke's constructive method, however imperfectly worked out, from the essentially destructive method of Hume.

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The Great Society. A Psychological Analysis. By GRAHAM WALLAS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xii, 383.

Those who have profited by this author's well-known *Human Nature in Politics* will welcome this volume, which is also written "with the purpose of bringing the knowledge which has been accumulated by psychologists into touch with the practical problems of present civilized life." By the "Great Society" is meant the organization of society in our time, transformed as it has become, in the extent and in the interdependence of its members, as a consequence of the industrial revolution. After outlining his main psychological positions, Professor Wallas considers in separate chapters the significance for the Great Society of habit, fear, pleasure-pain, crowd psychology, love and hatred, and the thought processes. While the importance of each of these is found to have been exaggerated by a different school of social philosophers, all, except perhaps fear, are to some extent practically desirable as agencies of social control.

The "crowd psychologists"—Bagehot, Tarde, Le Bon, and Ross—as well as McDougall, come in for particular criticism. It is shown that 'imitation,' 'suggestion' and 'sympathy' are loose descriptive phrases and lack scientific precision. In opposition to McDougall it is contended that the various thought processes are equally innate with the instincts, and in no way depen-

dent upon them either for their origin or for stimulation. Except for these differences, however, Wallas would probably admit that his general conception of "dispositions" owes much to McDougall's doctrine of instincts. This book makes it evident that those hasty readers of *Human Nature and Politics* who classified Wallas with the crowd psychologists were in error, and that he is in no sense an anti-intellectualist. On the contrary, Wallas maintains that thought is the mental process of most value for the Great Society, and the two longest chapters in the book are devoted to a consideration of the social value of each form of thought—memory, imagination and reasoning—and of the question through what forms of social organization and procedure thought can best be carried on. In this connection various British governing bodies—town and borough councils, cabinets, and houses of Parliament—as well as the American Congress, are discussed. The concluding two chapters respectively consider through what social organizations the Great Society can best achieve its will, and how best secure the happiness of its members. In this connection private property, socialism, syndicalism, and the feministic movement all come in for critical appreciation.

It is impossible in an outline to do justice to the richness and suggestiveness of a writer like Professor Wallas, whose service in great measure consists in his rich store of illustrations drawn from wide administrative experience and acquaintance with men in our generation. He presents the empirical significance of each theory and point of view as it actually works out in public life most concretely and convincingly.

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From Locke to Montessori. A Critical Account of the Montessori Point of View.

By WILLIAM BOYD. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1914.—pp. 271.

In the introductory chapter, after mentioning the wide popularity of Madam Montessori's educational theories, the author expresses the belief that it is necessary to examine the postulates of her theory before subscribing to it. "Especially," he says, "we must know whether we are in substantial agreement with the general view of life taken by Dr. Montessori before subscribing to her educational principles" (p. 17). It is refreshing to find an author with the courage to pass beyond the stereotyped phrases of a popular educational plan to an examination of its philosophy of life. Many pages have been written about Montessori in which the reader is never led to suspect that there are any philosophical conceptions underlying the *ipse dixit* rules of her program. Many of her most enthusiastic followers have apparently been satisfied to repeat her profession that she has no preconceived notion of the nature of education. This is a curious case of self-deception; for even if it were not evident upon general principles that educational theories are built upon philosophical conceptions he who runs may read that Madam Montessori, notwithstanding her sincere protest, has a very definite philosophy of life back of her rules of education. The author further increases our confidence